The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and proposes two logical systems with modality "coalition has a strategy to transition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given goal." The logical properties of this modality depend on whether the modal language allows the empty coalition. The main technical results are a completeness theorem for a logical system with the empty coalition, a strong completeness theorem for the logical system without the empty coalition, and an incompleteness theorem which shows that there is no strongly complete logical system in the language with the empty coalition.
Introduction
In this article we study coalition power in stochastic games. An example of such a game is the road situation depicted in Figure 1 . In this situation, self-driving car a is trying to pass self-driving car b. Unexpectedly, a truck moving in the opposite direction appears on the road. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that cars a and b have only three strategies: slow-down (−), maintain the current speed (0), and accelerate (+). We also assume that the truck is too heavy to significantly change the speed before a possible collision. If cars a and b cooperate, there are two sensible things that they can do: (i) car b can accelerate letting car a to slow down and to return to The diagram in Figure 2 describes probabilities of different outcomes of all possible combinations of actions of cars a and b. This diagram has five states: state p is the current ("passing") state of the system. States ab and ba represent outcomes in which car a ends up, respectively, behind and ahead of car b. States f c and f t are "failure" states: in the first of them there is a collision between cars, in the second car a collides with the truck. The actual probabilities of possible outcomes for any give combination of actions are captured by the labeled directed edges. For example, the directed edge from state p to state ab labeled with − + /1.0 means that in the case (i) above, when car a slows down (−) and car b accelerates (+), the system safely transitions into state ab with probability 1.0. This means that coalition {a, b} has a strategy that avoids collision with probability 1.0. We write this as [a, b] 1.0 ("Collision is avoided").
At the same time, directed edge from state p to state ba is labeled with + − /0.9. Hence, in the case (ii) above, the car a will be able to pass car b without collision with probability 0.9:
[a, b] 0.9 ("Pass without collision").
The label +−, 0 − /0.1 on the directed edge from state p to failure state f t denotes the fact that if car a either accelerates (+) or maintains the same speed (0), while car b slows down (−), then car a will collide with the track with probability 0.1. Note that car a alone does not have a strategy to pass without collision with probability 0.9. Indeed, if car a decides to accelerate (+), then depending on if car b slows down (−), maintains the current speed (0), or accelerates (+), the probability of passing without collision will be 0.9, 0.6, and 0.0. Thus, although car a, of course, has a strategy to pass without collision with probability 0.0:
[a] 0.0 ("Pass without collision"), it does not have a strategy to pass that would guarantee survival with any positive probability ε > 0:
¬[a] ε ("Pass without collision"). In this article we study properties of modality [C] p ϕ that stands for "coalition C has a strategy that achieves ϕ in all non-failure states and is guaranteed to avoid failure states with probability at least p". If p = 1.0, then this is essentially coalition power modality introduced by Marc Pauly [1, 2] . Pauly proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition power. His approach has been widely studied in the literature [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] .
Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman introduced Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities [15] . Goranko and van Drimmelen [16] gave a complete axiomatization of ATL. Decidability and model checking problems for ATL-like systems has also been widely studied [17, 18, 19] . Chen and Lu added the probability of achieving a goal to ATL and developed model checking algorithms for the proposed system [20] . Another version of ATL with probabilistic success was proposed by Bulling and Jamroga [21] . They considered modality A p ω ϕ that stands for "coalition C can bring about ϕ with success level of at least p when the opponents behave according to ω" and investigated its model checking properties. Unlike our approach in the current paper, neither of these works distinguish failure states from non-failure states. The probability of success in their systems is the probability of achieving ϕ, not the probability of avoiding a failure state. Novák and Jamroga [22, Definition 2.5] defined probability of a "successful execution" of an action as probability of an action to achieve its expected effect. They called failure any execution when an action does not achieve the expected ("annotated") effect. This, in essence, is the probability studied in our article. Since we consider a multiagent setting, we find it more intuitive to talk about failure states rather than failure of individual actions or action profiles. Later in the paper [22] , however, Novák and Jamroga introduced modality [τ ] p ϕ that refers to probability of an agent program τ to achieve goal ϕ and not a probability of individual actions to fail. Huang, Su, and Zhang combined perfect recall and coalition power to achieve a goal with a certain probability. They discussed model checking properties of their logical system [23] . Coalition power to achieve a goal with a certain probability is also used in PRISM-games, a model checker for stochastic multi-player games [24, 25] . None of these works on probabilistic extensions of ATL contain completeness results.
Alternative approaches to expressing the power to achieve a goal in a temporal setting are the STIT logic [26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and Strategy Logic [31, 32, 18, 33] . Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard have shown that coalition logic can be embedded into a variation of STIT logic [34] . We are not aware of any probabilistic versions of either STIT or Strategy Logic.
Outline of the Contribution
In this article we axiomatize the properties of modality [C] p in stochastic game. It turns out that the axiomatization results depend significantly on whether the language allows the empty coalition or not. If the empty coalition is allowed, then one can use it to write formula [∅] p , which means that the system will unavoidably survive with probability p. Similarly, [∅] p ϕ means that the system will unavoidably survive with probability p and statement ϕ will be true in the next state. Unavoidability cannot be expressed in the language without the empty coalition. In this article we introduce two different logical systems for modality [C] p . The first of these systems, L, allows coalition C to be empty and the second, L + , does not. We describe the syntax and semantics of L and L + in Section 3. We introduce the axioms and the inference rules for the logical systems in Section 4 and prove the soundness of the axioms in Section 5. The main technical contributions of this article are the completeness theorem for system L and the strong completeness theorem for system L + , which we prove in Section 6. Additionally, in Section 7 we prove that no strongly sound logical system is strongly complete in the language with the empty coalition. In Section 8 we discuss the decidability of the systems. Finally, we conclude the article in Section 9.
Syntax and Semantics
In the current section we introduce the formal syntax and the formal semantics for logical systems L and L + . The language Φ of the first of these systems allows set C to be empty and language Φ + of the second does not. In both cases, we assume a fixed finite set of agents A and a fixed set of propositional variables. Additionally, a coalition is any subset of A. Definition 1. Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that
[C] p ϕ ∈ Φ for each coalition C, each real number p such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and each formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
In other words, Φ is the language specified by the following grammar
We assume that Boolean constants and ⊥ are defined in our languages in the standard way. By Φ + we denote the subset of Φ that contains all formulae in Φ that do not use empty coalitions. In other words, language Φ + could be defined as in Definition 1 but with an additional assumption that coalition C is not empty. Let X Y be the set of all functions from set Y to set X. for each state s ∈ S and each function δ ∈ D A , 5. π is a function from propositional variables into subsets of S.
By F we denote the complement S \ F of the set F . A function from set D A is called a complete action profile.
In the introductory example depicted in Figure 2 , the set of agents A consists of car a and car b. The set of states S is {ab, f c , p, f t , ba} and the set of failure states F is {f c , f t }. The domain of actions D is {−, 0, +}. Although formally a complete action profile δ is a function from set of all agents A to the domain of actions D, in the case of our introductory example it is more convenient to refer to such profiles by pairs αβ, where α = δ(a) and β = δ(b). The function P is specified by labels on the directed edges in the diagram. We use commas to denote multiple functions with the same probability. For example, the label "−0, 0 + /0.9" on the directed edge from state p to state ab means that P (p, −0, ab) = 0.9 and P (p, 0+, ab) = 0.9.
Next is the key definition of this article. Its item 4 formally specifies the semantics of the modality [C] p . In this definition we use term action profile of a coalition to refer to a function δ that assigns an action δ(a) to each agent a of a coalition C. Also, note that for any two relations
If f and g are partial functions (functional relations), then f ⊆ g means that function g is an extension of function f .
Definition 3.
For any state s ∈ F of a stochastic game (S, F, D, P, π) and any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, the satisfiability relation s ϕ is defined recursively as follows:
Logical Systems
In this section we introduce the axioms and the inference rules of logical systems L and L + in languages Φ and Φ + respectively. In addition to propositional tautologies in the corresponding language, each system contains the following axioms:
The Cooperation axiom in the form without subscripts goes back to Marc Pauly [1, 2] . Informally, it says that two coalitions can combine their strategies to achieve a common goal. The assumption that coalitions C 1 and C 2 are disjoint is important because a hypothetical common agent of these two coalitions might be required to choose different actions under strategies of these two coalitions.
Our version of the Cooperation axiom adds probability of non-failure subscript to the original version of this axiom. Perhaps one might think that the conclusion of the axiom should have subscript min{p, q} rather than max{p, q}. This is not true because, according to Definition 3, statement [C] p ϕ means that coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ with probability of non-failure of at least p regardless of what actions are chosen by the other agents.
The Monotonicity axiom says that if a coalition C can achieve goal ϕ with probability of non-failure of at least p, then coalition C can achieve ϕ with probability of non-failure of at least q, where q ≤ p.
Finally, the Unachievability of Falsehood axiom says that no coalition can achieve falsehood with a positive probability.
We write L ϕ if formula ϕ ∈ Φ is provable from the above axioms using the Modus Ponens and the Necessitation inference rules:
Notice that the Necessitation inference rule with positive subscript is not, generally speaking, valid. Indeed, formula is universally true but coalition C may not have a strategy that guarantees the non-failure of the system with a positive probability. Thus, [C] p is not a universally true formula for p > 0. Let L + ϕ if formula ϕ ∈ Φ + is provable (using only formulae in language Φ + ) from the above axioms using the Modus Ponens, the Necessitation, and the Monotonicity
inference rules. We excluded the Monotonicity rule from system L because, as we show below, it is derivable in L.
by the Necessitation inference rule. Consider now the following instance of the Cooperation axiom:
is provable from the theorems of logical system L (or L + ) and a set of additional axioms X using only the Modus Ponens inference rule. Note that if set X is empty, then statement X L ϕ is equivalent to L ϕ and statement X L + ϕ is equivalent to L + ϕ. We often write ϕ and X ϕ if it is clear from the context which logical system we refer to. We say that set X is consistent if X ⊥.
Proof. Suppose that sequence ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n is a proof from set X ∪ {ϕ} and the theorems of our logical system that uses the Modus Ponens inference rule only. In other words, for each k ≤ n, either
It suffices to show that X, ϕ ψ k for each k ≤ n. We prove this by induction on k through considering the four cases above separately.
is a propositional tautology, and thus, is an axiom of our logical system. Hence, ϕ → ψ k by the Modus Ponens inference rule. Therefore, X ϕ → ψ k .
) is a propositional tautology. Therefore, X ϕ → ψ k by applying the Modus Ponens inference rule twice.
Note that it is important for the above proof that X ϕ stands for derivability only using the Modus Ponens inference rule. For example, if the Necessitation inference rule is allowed, then the proof will have to include one more case where ψ k is formula [C] 0 ψ i for some coalition C ⊆ A, and some integer i < k. In this case we will need to prove that if X ϕ → ψ i , then X ϕ → [C] 0 ψ i , which is not true.
Lemma 3 (Lindenbaum). For either L or L + , any consistent set of formulae can be extended to a maximal consistent set of formulae.
Proof. The standard proof of Lindenbaum's lemma applies here [35, Proposition 2.14] . However, since the formulae in our logical systems use real numbers in subscript, the set of formulae is uncountable. Thus, the proof of Lindenbaum's lemma in our case relies on the Axiom of Choice.
We conclude this section by giving an example of a formal derivation in our logical systems. This result is used later in the proof of the completeness. 
Proof. We give a common proof for both parts of the lemma. If C = D,
Suppose now that C D. Thus set D \ C is not empty. Note that ϕ → ϕ is a propositional tautology. Thus, [D \ C] 0 (ϕ → ϕ) by the Necessitation inference rule. At the same time, because (D \ C) ∩ C = ∅, the following formula is an instance of the Cooperation axiom:
Hence, by the Modus Ponens inference rule,
Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of each of our axioms as a separate lemma. The same proof applies to both system L and system L + . The soundness of the systems is stated in the end of the section as Theorem 1.
Lemma 5. For any state s ∈ F of a stochastic game (S, F, D, P, π), any coalitions C 1 and C 2 , any formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ, and any real numbers p, q such
Proof. By Definition 3, assumption s [C 1 ] p (ϕ → ψ) implies that there is an action profile δ 1 ∈ D C 1 such that for any complete action profile δ ∈ D A , if δ 1 ⊆ δ , then
Additionally, by Definition 3, assumption s [C 2 ] q ϕ implies that there is an action profile δ 1 ∈ D C 2 such that for any complete action profile δ ∈ D A if δ 2 ⊆ δ , then
3.
t∈F P (s, δ , t) ≥ q, 4. if P (s, δ , t) > 0, then t ϕ, for each t ∈ F .
Let action profile δ of coalitions C 1 ∪ C 2 be defined as
Action profile δ is well-defined because coalitions C 1 and C 2 are disjoint by an assumption of the lemma.
Consider an arbitrary complete action profile δ such that δ ⊆ δ . Note that
by equation (1) and the assumption δ ⊆ δ . Thus, by Definition 3 and the above assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, Proof. By Definition 3, assumption s [C] p ϕ implies that there is an action profile δ 1 ∈ D C such that for any complete action profile δ ∈ D A if δ 1 ⊆ δ , then 1.
t∈F P (s, δ , t) ≥ p, 2. if P (s, δ , t) > 0, then t ϕ, for each t ∈ F .
Note that
t∈F P (s, δ , t) ≥ p ≥ q by assumption q ≤ p of the lemma. Therefore, s [C] q ϕ by Definition 3. 
Proof. Suppose that s
[C] p ⊥. Thus, by Definition 3, there is an action profile δ 1 ∈ D C such that for any complete action profile δ ∈ D A if δ 1 ⊆ δ , then 1.
Notice that t∈F P (s, δ , t) ≥ p > 0 due to the assumption 0 < p of the lemma. Hence, there exists state t ∈ F such that P (s, δ , t) > 0. Thus, t ⊥ by item 2 above, which contradicts the definition of ⊥ and Definition 3.
The soundness theorem for our logical systems with respect to the semantics described above follows from Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7.
Theorem 1. For either L or L + , if ϕ, then s ϕ for each state s ∈ F of each stochastic game (S, F, D, P, π).
Completeness
In this section we prove weak completeness of system L and strong completeness of L + with respect to the semantics of stochastic games. These results are stated later in this section as Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Let Ψ be either language Φ or Φ + and Σ be any subset of Ψ such that (a) Σ is closed with respect to subformulae and (b) if σ ∈ Σ, then ¬σ ∈ Σ, unless the formula σ itself is a negation. We distinguish Σ from the whole set Ψ so that later set Σ could be assumed to be finite. We start the proof by defining the canonical stochastic game G(Ψ, Σ) = (S, F, D, P, π). Informally, by choosing the action (ϕ, p), the agent is requesting the game to transition to a non-failure state with probability at least p and formula ϕ to be true at that state. The game might grant or ignore this request. In particular, the game ignores the request if p / ∈ [0, 1].
Next, we define function P . This is done in Definition 9 through auxiliary functions µ(s, δ) and T (s, δ). Function µ(s, δ) specifies the probability of the canonical game to transition from state s under complete action profile δ into a into non-failure state. For each [C] p ϕ ∈ s we want the game to transition to a non-failure state with probability at least p if all members of coalition C choose action (ϕ, p). Thus, we define µ(s, δ) to be the maximum among such p. In the definition below we assume that the maximum of the empty set is equal to 0. Proof. Consider set X = {p | [C] p ϕ ∈ s, ∀a ∈ C(δ(a) = (ϕ, p))}. Note that X ⊆ [0, 1] by Definition 1. To prove that value µ(s, δ) is well-defined by Definition 7, it suffices to show that set X is finite. Indeed, set s is finite because it is a subset of finite set Σ. Therefore, set X is finite by the choice of set X. Proof. Consider set X = {p | [C] p ϕ ∈ s, ∀a ∈ C(δ(a) = (ϕ, p))}. Note that X ⊆ [0, 1] by Definition 1. To prove that value µ(s, δ) is well-defined by Definition 7, it suffices to show that set X is finite. Recall that set of all agents A is finite. Thus, set {p | ∃a ∈ A ∃ϕ ∈ Φ (δ(a) = (ϕ, p))} is finite. Therefore, set X is finite because any coalition C in a formula [C] p ϕ ∈ Φ + is nonempty. We are now ready to define function P (s, δ, s ) that specifies the probability of the canonical game to transition from a state s to a state s under a complete action profile δ. 
where |T (s, δ)| is the size of set T (s, δ).
We prove that s ∈F P (s, δ, s ) = 1 in Lemma 13. But first we show that µ(s, δ) is an upper bound on the sum of probabilities of transitioning to a non-failure state. Proof. We consider the following two cases separately: 
This concludes the definition of the canonical stochastic game G(Ψ, Σ) = (S, F, D, P, π) in cases when either Σ is finite or Ψ = Φ + . Throughout the rest of this section we assume that one of these two conditions is true. The next lemma is the key lemma in the proof of the completeness. It shows that if ¬[C] p ϕ ∈ s, then in state s coalition C has no strategy to transition to a non-failure state with probability at least p and to guarantee that ϕ is true in that state. 
Suppose that µ(s, δ ) ≥ p. We will show that there is a state s ∈ F such that P (s, δ , s ) > 0 and ¬ϕ ∈ s . Consider set
First, we prove that set X 0 is consistent. Suppose the opposite, thus there must exist formulae [
Without loss of generality, we can assume that formulae ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n are distinct. Note that sets B 1 , . . . , B n are pairwise disjoint because of statement (5) . Due to Definition 9, q 1 , . . . , q n ≤ µ(s, δ ).
Additionally, by Definition 9 and the assumption of the case, we can suppose that there is an integer m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n and q m = µ(s, δ ).
Furthermore, we can assume that there is n ≤ n such that B i ⊆ C for each i ≤ n and B i C for each i > n . Let us first show that m ≤ n . Indeed, suppose that there is a 0 ∈ B m \ C. Thus, δ (a 0 ) = ( , −1) by equation (4) . Hence, q m = −1 due to equation (5) . Recall that µ(s, δ ) = q m by the choice of index m. Thus µ(s, δ ) = −1, which contradicts Lemma 8 (or Lemma 9 in case of system L + ). Therefore, m ≤ n .
Next, note that for each i > n we have ψ i = because B i C and due to equality (4) and equality (5) . Hence, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ϕ by statement (6). By Lemma 2 applied n times,
Note that n = 0 because 1 ≤ m ≤ n . So, by the Monotonicity inference rule,
By the Modus Ponens inference rule,
By the Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens rule,
By repeating the previous step n − 2 more times,
Thus, by the choice of formulae [
Then, by Lemma 4 and because B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ C,
Recall that q ≤ n . Thus, max{q 1 , . . . , q n } = µ(s, δ ) by inequality (7) and equation (8) . Hence, s [C] µ(s,δ ) ϕ. Thus, s [C] p ϕ by the Monotonicity axiom and the assumption µ(s, δ ) ≥ p. Then, ¬[C] p ϕ / ∈ s due to consistency of set s, which contradicts the assumption of the lemma. Therefore, set X 0 is consistent. By Lemma 3, there is a maximal consistent extension s of set X 0 . Note that ¬ϕ ∈ s by the choice of set X 0 .
Note that s ∈ T (s, δ ) by Definition 8 and the choice of sets X 0 and s . Thus, set T (s, δ ) is not empty. Hence, by the assumption of the case,
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Recall that we left unproven the fact that s ∈F P (s, δ, s ) = 1. This will be shown in Lemma 13 using the following auxiliary lemma. Proof. We consider the following three cases separately. The following lemma shows that if [C] p ϕ ∈ s, then in state s coalition C has a strategy which guarantees that the game transitions to a non-failure state with probability at least p and ϕ will be true in that state. 
Assume that [C] p ψ / ∈ s. Thus, ¬[C] p ψ ∈ s due to the maximality of set s. Hence, by Lemma 11 there is δ ∈ D A such that δ ⊆ δ and one of the following is true:
3. µ(s, δ ) < p, 4. there is an s ∈ F such that P (s, δ , s ) > 0 and ¬ϕ ∈ s .
Note that statement 3 can not be true due to inequality (9) . Thus, there is s ∈ F where P (s, δ , s ) > 0 and ¬ψ ∈ s . Hence, ψ / ∈ s due to the consistency of set s . Thus, s ψ by the induction hypothesis, which contradicts to statement 2 above.
We are now ready to state and to prove the (weak) completeness for system L and strong completeness for system L + . Theorem 2. If ϕ ∈ Φ and L ϕ, then there is a state s of a stochastic game such that s ϕ.
Proof. Let Σ ⊆ Φ be any finite set of formulae such that (a) ¬ϕ ∈ Σ; (b) Σ is closed with respect to subformulae; (c) if σ ∈ Σ, then ¬σ ∈ Σ, unless formula σ itself is a negation. Consider canonical stochastic game G(Φ, Σ) = (S, F, D, P, π).
By Lemma 3, assumption L ϕ implies that there is a maximal consistent set s ⊆ Σ such that ¬ϕ ∈ s. Note that s ∈ S by Definition 4 and ϕ / ∈ s because set s is consistent. Therefore, s ϕ by Lemma 15.
Theorem 3. If X ⊆ Φ + , ϕ ∈ Φ + , and X L + ϕ, then there is a state s of a stochastic game such that s χ for each χ ∈ X and s ϕ.
Proof. Let (S, F, D, P, π) be the canonical stochastic game G(Φ + , Φ + ). Suppose that X L + ϕ. Hence, set X ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent in L + . By Lemma 3, there is a maximal consistent in L + extension s ⊆ Φ + of set X ∪{¬ϕ}. Then, s ∈ S by Definition 4. Note that ϕ / ∈ s due to the consistency of set s. Also, χ ∈ s for each χ ∈ X because X ⊆ s. Therefore, s χ for each χ ∈ X and s ϕ by Lemma 15.
Incompleteness
In this section we show that no logical system in language Φ is strongly complete with respect to the semantics of stochastic games. This result is formally stated as Theorem 4.
Definition 11. X semantically entails ϕ, written as X ϕ, when for any state s of any stochastic game, if s χ for each χ ∈ X, then s ϕ.
Definition 12. A logical system S is strongly sound with respect to stochastic games if X S ϕ implies X ϕ for each set of formulae X and each formula ϕ.
Definition 13. A logical system S is strongly complete with respect to stochastic games if X ϕ implies X S ϕ for each set of formulae X and each formula ϕ.
Theorem 4 (incompleteness). Any strongly sound with respect to stochastic games logical system in language Φ is not strongly complete.
Proof. Suppose that a logical system S in language Φ is strongly sound and strongly complete with respect to stochastic games. Consider following infinite subset of Φ:
Proof of Claim. Suppose that s [∅] 1−10 −n for each n ≥ 0 for some state s ∈ S of a stochastic game (S, F, D, P, π). Thus, by Definition 3, for each n ≥ 0 there is an action profile δ n ∈ D ∅ such that for each complete action profile δ ∈ D A , if δ n ⊆ δ , then t∈F P (s, δ , t) ≥ 1 − 10 −n .
Since δ n is an action profile of an empty coalition, statement δ n ⊆ δ is vacuously true for any complete action profile δ . Hence, for each n ≥ 0 and Consider now a stochastic game depicted in Figure 3 . This game has three states: s, f , and t. The domain of actions of the game consists of a single element. Thus, the game has only one complete action profile that we refer to as δ. From state s the game transitions into state t with prob-ability 1 − 10 −N and it transitions to failure state f with probability 10 −N . From state t the game always transitions back to state t. Additionally, from failure state f the game always transitions back to failure state f . Thus, s
[∅] 1−10 −n for each n ≤ N and s [∅] 1 by Definition 3. The last statement, by Definition 11, contradicts statement (10).
Decidability
The languages Φ and Φ + are not countable because we consider modalities labeled by real numbers in the interval [0, 1]. The languages will become countable if we restrict labels to rational numbers in the same interval. In this case, the set of theorems of logical system L is decidable because proof of Theorem 2 establishes completeness of our system with respect to the class of finite stochastic games. Then, system L + is also decidable because its theorems are exactly the theorems of L restricted to language Φ + .
Conclusion
In this article we have proposed a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and a logic of coalition power with modality that incorporates probability of non-failure. It has turned out that the logical properties of this modality significantly depend on whether the language allows empty coalitions. We have proven a strong completeness theorem for the language without the empty coalition and a weak completeness theorem for the language with the empty coalition. We have also shown that if the language includes the empty coalition, then no strongly sound and strongly complete axiomatization of the logic exists. Finally, we have observed the decidability of the logical systems discussed in the article.
